attack by Iraqi reserves. The shortcomings of this plan fostered recognition of the need for additional ground forces.

          On November 8, 1990, the President announced his decision to increase U.S. forces in theater to provide a more effective offensive option. With the decision to deploy the VII Corps from Europe, CENTCOM planners developed a more detailed ground offensive plan that began to take the form of the campaign that was ultimately conducted. Additional forces meant that the envelopment could be shifted farther to the west to circumvent the strength of the Iraqi defenses, envelop the Iraqi Army in Kuwait and destroy the Republican Guard operational reserve in southeastern Iraq.

          This maneuver became known as the " Left Hook ". It was to be conducted in concert with the threat of an amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast to focus Iraqi attention to the east and supporting attacks by Marines and pan - Arab forces in the center to hold Iraqi tactical reserves in place.

          The assumption of a successful air campaign was integral to planning for the ground campaign. The air campaign was to reduce Iraqi ground units by at least 50 percent and Iraqi artillery by 90 percent in those areas where breaching operations were anticipated.

          Perhaps because of the compartmented nature of the planning process, there are conflicting reports about the origins of the " Left Hook ", which was intended to capitalize on the superior ability of U.S. forces to concentrate allied combat power against Iraqi vulnerabilities.

Low Casualties the Highest Goal

          In planning Operation Desert Storm, minimizing allied and civilian casualties was the highest priority. From the outset of the planning effort, air power was intended to be fully employed to prepare the battlefield. Likewise, planning for the ground campaign was to avoid Iraqi strengths and rely instead on deception and maneuver to apply our strengths against Iraqi vulnerabilities. Deploying overwhelming U.S. military force in the theater and doing nothing to provoke a ground war before U.S. and allied forces were ready also proved invaluable to CENTCOM's objective of minimizing casualties in the conflict.

          As mentioned, deception was a key element of Operation Desert Storm and, in particular, of the ground campaign. The objective of the deception was to convince the Iraqi leadership and army that the coalition forces would attack directly into the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait, engaging in the battles of attrition that characterized the Iran - Iraq War. This, in turn, would result in high U.S. casualties.

          When the VII Corps deployed into the theater from Europe, it occupied tactical assembly areas in the southeast. The VII Corps and the already - deployed XVIII Corps delayed their movement to the west until early February 1991, at which time the covert move commenced. CENTCOM's plan called for a feint by the 1st Cavalry Division to reinforce the deception of the major coalition ground attack being initiated in this central sector. Likewise, a small Marine Task Force would mask a move westward by the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. Marines afloat in the Persian Gulf would provide the

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